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RESUME : Dans ce papier, nous examinons les 
conséquences économiques de l’utilisation de 
l’anglais dans le rapport annuel de sociétés de pays 
non-anglophones. Utilisant un échantillon de 166 
sociétés qui commencent à publier un rapport 
annuel en anglais en plus d’un rapport annuel dans 
leur langue locale, nous montrons que l’asymétrie 
d’information (mesurée par la fourchette de prix) est 
réduite, le suivi des analystes augmente et le 
nombre d’investisseurs étrangers est accru. Nos 
résultats sont obtenus dans le cadre d’une analyse 
d’une « différence dans les différences ». Pour 
contrôler le phénomène d’endogénéité, nous 
mettons en œuvre une procédure d’appariement 
« par score de propension ». Nos résultats suggèrent 
que la langue en tant que telle contribue à une 
augmentation de l’efficience des marchés en 
fournissant davantage d’information. 
 ABSTRACT: In this paper, we investigate the 
economic consequences of using English as an 
external reporting language for firms from non-
English speaking countries. We use a difference-in-
differences technique to estimate the effect of 
language. We use a sample of 166 firms that start 
publishing an annual report in English in addition to 
an annual report in their local language. We 
benchmark these firms to a sample of control firms 
defined via a propensity score matching procedure 
to control for endogeneity in the choice of the 
reporting language. We show that information 
asymmetry (measured as the bid-ask spread) is 
reduced, analyst following is enlarged and a greater 
investor base (measured as a higher number of 
foreign investors) is attracted. Our findings suggest 
that language per se may contribute to an increase 
in market efficiency by providing information 
accessible to more market participants. 
   
Mots-clés : rapport annuel, conséquences 
économiques, traduction, anglais, fourchette de prix, 
suivi des analystes, actionnariat étranger, 
différences dans les différences, score de 
propension. 
 Keywords: annual report; economic consequences; 
translation; English; bid-ask spread; analyst 
following; foreign ownership, difference-in-
differences, propensity score matching. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decades several changes in reporting and financial regulations have become 
effective and forced companies to provide significantly more detailed information in terms of 
required disclosures to external users. Besides press releases and more informal 
communication channels the most commonly used communication interface between a firm 
and its interested parties is still the annual report. Since smaller firms more often restrict their 
operating and geographical business area to their country of origin, their annual report is most 
often published in the language of the country where the company is incorporated. However, 
if the country of origin is a non-English speaking country, the information disclosed in the 
local-language annual report is, to put it baldly, not accessible to external users who cannot 
understand the reporting language. At firm level, one way out is to publish a second annual 
report in English, as the “lingua franca of international business is English” (Charles, 2007). 
Given the increasing need to address a broad investor base and information intermediaries 
(such as analysts and brokerage firms), the question naturally arises as to the role of English 
as the reporting language of choice. Specifically, does an annual report published in English 
reduce information asymmetry and provide more useful – or even not yet priced – information 
to financial statement users, or are users in fact aware of all the information already available 
to the company’s domestic market?  
In this paper, we attempt to answer this question by examining the economic 
consequences of using English as an external reporting language for firms from non-English 
speaking countries. The motivation for focusing on the role of (the English) language as an 
(additional) information transmitter rather than looking at the role of national and 
international GAAP is twofold.  
First, we see a discrepancy between the management science/economics literature and the 
finance and accounting literature. In the past – and also very recently – researchers performed 
several investigations to study the effect of the English language at corporate level. They 
recognize that using a common language may facilitate trade and transactions (Mélitz, 2007, 
2008), eases intercorporate relationships (Marschan et al., 1997; Marschan-Piekkari et al., 
1999), and makes it more probable that multinational companies will export goods and 
services to foreign countries rather than running foreign production facilities, due to smaller 
communication costs (Brainard, 1997). Similarly, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a) remark 
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that “the firm’s language, culture and distance from the investor are three important 
familiarity attributes that might explain an investor’s preference for certain firms”. 
In contrast to these studies in economics and management, almost no studies directly 
investigate the consequences associated with the use of a common language in the accounting 
and finance literature. At best, language (or cultural aspects, which are related) is seen as a 
possible explanation for a home investment bias (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; 
Dvorak, 2005; Ammer et al., 2008), the superiority of country-specialized analysts over 
industry specialists (Sonney, 2009), more precise forecasts by local analysts compared to 
foreign analysts (Bae et al., 2008a; Bae et al., 2008b; Ramnath et al., 2008), a higher trading 
volume in local equity than foreign equity (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000, 2001a; Hau, 2001a, 
2001b; Portes and Rey, 2005), higher proximity between the company and its local investor 
base (Brainard, 1997; Fuller-Love, 1998; Rauch, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001a, 
2001b), lower information asymmetry (Brennan and Cao, 1997), and broader international 
ownership (Bailey et al., 2006; Alves and Ferreira, 2008; Kalev et al., 2008). However, none 
of these papers directly test consequences associated with the use of a specific language, even 
though Foy pointed out already in 1973 that “the annual report is one of the most important 
documents a publicly owned company produces” (Foy, 1973).  
The second motivation for our study relates to comparability. The language used in the 
annual report is a crucial ingredient of financial information comparability. Proponents of 
accounting harmonization usually argue that common standards will enhance the 
comparability of financial statements, improve corporate transparency, and increase the 
quality of financial reporting. For instance, the adoption of International Accounting 
Standards or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is found to be associated 
with a lower cost of capital and transaction costs, a higher market value (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000) and reduced home bias (Covrig et al., 2007). But this association between accounting 
harmonization and increased comparability in financial statements relies heavily on the 
assumption that market participants are able to read and understand any set of financial 
statements, as long as they are governed by the same accounting rules. It is noticeable that 
accounting is frequently referred to as a “common language” or the “language of business” in 
textbooks (Kim, 1995; Benston et al., 2006). However, the first barrier (before we even reach 
the question of accounting standards) to understanding and comparing financial statements 
and increasing transparency is the language barrier. In this respect, using English for external 
reporting purposes is the only way to address any outsider of the firm easily and directly, and 
to reduce the costs of information acquisition. These reasons make the language in which 
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annual reports are actually published an interesting setting to examine the effects of external 
communication policies on measurable economic consequences for the firm. 
In this study we attempt to address this issue and try to identify the economic 
consequences of using English as an external reporting language for firms from non-English 
speaking countries. Specifically, we test the relationship between publishing an Annual 
Report in English (ARE)1 and information asymmetry, plus analyst and investor behavior. We 
expect that firms issuing an ARE will benefit from (1) lower information asymmetry, (2) a 
larger analyst following, and (3) an enlarged and more international investor base. Our 
measures include median bid-ask spreads, analyst following and foreign ownership. To test 
our hypotheses, we use a sample of firms that decided to publish an ARE in addition to their 
local language annual report. We call these firms “adopters” (or treatment firms) in the rest of 
this paper, as they have adopted a new reporting policy. This sample is drawn from the Global 
Reports database, which identifies the language used by firms in their annual reports. From 
the initial database of 3,236 firms (10,278 observations), we identify 166 European firms 
which decided to publish an ARE in addition to their local-language report.2 Cross-listed 
firms are excluded from our sample in order to avoid any confounding effect. 
We begin our analysis by examining the relationship between publishing an ARE and 
information asymmetry. According to the market efficiency hypothesis, financial markets are 
“informationally efficient”, that is, prices on traded assets (e.g., stock prices) already reflect 
all known information, and instantly change to reflect new information (Fama, 1970). Since 
information asymmetry is present in financial markets, the efficient market hypothesis has 
already been empirically and theoretically disputed (see, e.g., Basu, 1977; Rosenberg et al., 
1985; Fama and French, 1992; Chan et al., 2003). Moreover, it is obvious that a market can 
only be informationally efficient if information is understandable and accessible for (at least 
some) market participants. Since the English language makes it more possible and certainly 
easier to gather financial information published by the firm, we expect to find a negative 
connection between information asymmetry and the adoption of English as a reporting 
language. We argue that an ARE mitigates information asymmetry, which results in a lower 
median bid-ask spread. Our results support this hypothesis.  
                                                 
1 For the sake of simplicity, we use the expression “annual report in English” or ARE, in short, in the rest of this 
paper, to mean the English-language version of the annual report. 
2 For more information on our sample construction, see section 3. 
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Consistent with the predicted higher demand for analyst services in respect of 
internationally-oriented firms with an international ownership structure, we document a 
positive and significant association between a firm’s decision to publish an ARE and analyst 
following. Since analysts serve as information intermediaries, their presence should tend to 
increase transparency. 
Finally, we examine whether foreign ownership depends on the reporting language. We 
count the number of “foreign owners” (FO) for each firm-year observation. We expect that 
once a firm has decided to publish an ARE, it will attract more foreign owners. Our data 
confirm this hypothesis as well. Prior research has found that disclosure quality and visibility 
are important determinants of institutional investor ownership (Bushee and Noe, 2000; 
Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Bradshaw et al., 2004). Since companies in foreign countries 
increase their visibility when they adopt an ARE, our results are in line with previous studies.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we identify a new variable 
to explain information asymmetry. More precisely, we show that the publication of an ARE 
(in addition to the local language report) is associated with lower levels of information 
asymmetry, more analyst following, and a broader international ownership. While prior 
literature has identified the English language as a possible explanation for various phenomena 
observed in capital markets (home bias, institutional ownership, trading behavior, etc., see 
above), our paper is the first to directly address the question of the possible economic 
consequences of issuing an ARE. Second, we also add to the international accounting and 
finance literature. To explain information asymmetry, past literature investigated factors such 
as cross-listing (Bailey et al., 2006), the adoption of international accounting standards (Leuz, 
2003), or legal institutions (Leuz et al., 2003). We show that language used in the annual 
report is a vehicle to ease the understandability of financial statements by users of 
information. More precisely, we document that the economic significance of language is far 
from being marginal: the adoption of an ARE has an effect on information asymmetry that 
compares with the effect of the adoption of international accounting standards (IAS/IFRS).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide some 
background on annual report language and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
methodology, variables and sample, and section 4 presents our empirical evidence. Section 5 
concludes the paper and provides directions for future research. 
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2. Motivation and hypothesis development 
2.1 Importance of language for financial statements users 
As stated in the introduction, past literature concentrates on accounting as a language, not 
on the language used in annual reports per se. In this paper, we investigate whether the 
language used in the annual report has economic consequences. This investigation is based on 
the implicit assumption that the annual report is useful to investors. 
The literature on accounting information generally holds the view that accounting and 
financial statement data are not the only source of information for capital markets (Gonedes, 
1972; Emery, 1974; Gonedes, 1976). For example, insider trading sends information to capital 
markets (Seyhun, 1998). Analysts and rating agencies receive information before its 
publication in financial statements, and they transmit this information to the capital markets 
through their own publications. However, surveys and other research evidence have 
documented that the annual report is a vital, though not sufficient, source of information to 
analysts both in the US and elsewhere (e.g., Chang and Most, 1985; Vergoossen, 1993; 
Anonymous, 2000). Chang et al. (1983), for example, showed that the annual report was used 
as a basis for investment decisions. 
In the same vein, Marston (1996), quoted by Holland (2005), analyzed investor relations 
departments. Her findings are based on postal questionnaires sent to the top 500 quoted 
European companies in 18 different countries in 2002, and a series of 19 interviews with 
investor relations personnel from six countries. One-to-one meetings were ranked most 
important by respondents, with telephone calls a close second. These were followed by (in 
order of importance), “roadshows”, providing feedback on analysts’ reports and answering e-
mail queries. The results are consistent with Barker (1998) who found that “raw” data flowing 
directly from companies to investors and fund managers is more important than processed 
data generated by analysts. Barker (1998) concludes that the research literature has paid 
insufficient attention to the role of accounting information in direct communication between 
companies and fund managers. The importance of narratives and one-to-one contact also 
underlines the importance of language as an ingredient of the informational efficiency of 
markets. This is why we argue that language can be important to investors even if 
“fundamental information” (accounting numbers from financial statements) is accessible 
through financial databases such as Datastream©, Global©, Infinancials© or Worldscope©. 
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2.2 Hypothesis development 
Information asymmetry exists because some investors possess private information about a 
firm that is unavailable to other investors. One reason might be that corporate communication 
in a foreign language is more difficult for international investors and information 
intermediaries to understand, interpret and process because it requires more time and effort to 
extract and identify relevant information (see Lehavy et al., 2009). This creates an adverse 
selection problem, as informed investors may trade on their private information to the 
detriment of uninformed investors. Economic theory suggests that greater disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). From an empirical point of view, 
Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) reported that when firms improved their disclosures, there 
was a resulting increase in stock return, institutional ownership and analyst following and a 
decrease in bid-ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion. Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2005) 
reported a negative association between disclosure quality and spread measures, while Brown 
and Hillegeist (2007) also found a negative relationship with the probability of informed 
trading.  
This disclosure literature implicitly assumes that all disclosure is read and utilized by 
market participants. Contrary to this assumption, there is a large body of literature on the 
visibility of the firm and its impact on price. This literature draws on Merton (1987), which 
suggests that investors will only invest in firms they are familiar with. As a consequence, an 
increase in the size of a firm’s investor base (i.e., the number of investors that are aware of the 
firm’s existence) will reduce its cost of capital.  
In this paper, we argue that issuing an ARE is a way for firms to increase their visibility 
to investors and financial analysts. Several factors underlie this positive association. First, 
English is a lingua franca: it is the world’s second language (after Mandarin and together with 
Spanish) in terms of native speakers3. Second, English is the language of business: stock 
exchanges located in English-speaking countries represent 65% of the world stock market 
capitalization4, and 93% of financial analysts who are members of the CFA institute are 
located in English-speaking countries.5  
                                                 
3 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_languages_by_number_of_native_speakers 
4 Source http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics 
5 See www.cfa.institute.com 
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There is a growing volume of empirical literature which examines the visibility attributes 
that drive investment preferences, including international home bias (e.g., French and Poterba, 
1991; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Kang and Stulz, 1997), advertising intensity (Grullon et al., 
2004), press coverage (Falkenstein, 1996), and presentations to analysts (Francis et al., 1997). 
The driving force behind the results found in all these studies is the informational advantage 
held by some market participants over others. However, an informational advantage for some 
agents implies nothing more than the existence of information asymmetry in the market. One 
way information asymmetry may be captured – or even mitigated – is an often used and cited 
proxy for informational advantage: “market proximity”. Market proximity can concern 
geographical, economic, industrial, and cultural characteristics and mainly leads to smaller 
bid-ask spreads – our proxy for information asymmetry. Culture and geographical proximity 
themselves are mainly influenced and connected by the existence of a common language. 
Various studies have explicitly linked the existence of a common language to trading 
behavior, portfolio allocation decisions, and information asymmetry. Tesar and Werner 
(1995), for example, focus on “language, institutional and regulatory differences and the cost 
of obtaining information about foreign markets” and suggest that “geographic proximity 
seems to be an important ingredient in the international portfolio allocation decision”. In their 
study on gross cross-border equity flows between 14 countries, Portes and Rey (2005) find 
that only a language dummy is a significant factor in certain specifications for asset trade, 
whereas dummies and other common variables in the goods trade literature such as “trading 
blocs”, “time and country specific dummies” and others remain insignificant. Sarkissian and 
Schill (2004) note that the studies of Gehrig (1993), Kang and Stulz (1997), Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999, 2001), and Hubermann (2001) all find that the cultural proximity as well as 
the geographic proximity of the market has an important influence on investor stockholding 
and trading. They report as their main result that there is more cross-listing activity across 
countries that share similar language or colonial ties, since there is lower information 
asymmetry. In the same vein, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a) document that investors are 
more likely to trade in stocks of firms that share (or at least communicate in) the same 
language as the investor, and have a similar cultural background. The reason for this is the 
greater information flow between market participants with the same language or historical 
ties. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001a) point out that “if a company perceives that a large 
proportion of its shareowners prefer a particular language, the company may chose to 
communicate in that language”. According to Rauch (1999), common language and colonial 
ties should have the greatest (positive) effects on trading volume (and hence on bid-ask 
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spreads), and search costs – which can in our case be interpreted as translation costs – should 
form the greatest barrier to trade. Hau (2001b), in his study on transaction data from the Xetra 
trading system at the German Security exchange, finds that traders outside Germany in non-
German-speaking locations face an information disadvantage, and trade less and with smaller 
profitability. He remarks that “the information barrier may be either linguistic or geographic 
in nature”. In a closely related study on the same dataset, Hau (2001a) expects that foreign 
investors are likely to use domestic intermediaries if they believe that domestic traders enjoy 
an information advantage which will benefit their own investment choice. Huberman (2001) 
summarizes the evidence by saying “Together, these phenomena provide compelling evidence 
that people invest in the familiar while often ignoring the principles of portfolio theory”. 
Altogether, these studies highlight the (potential) importance of the language a company 
communicates in and suggest that disclosure must be visible to be effective (in terms of 
capital market consequences). Publishing an ARE in non-English-speaking countries should 
have a positive impact on the international visibility of firms’ reporting, which should lead to 
a reduction in information asymmetry in the market. Therefore, our first hypothesis is the 
following: 
 
H1: Firms adopting English in their annual report experience a reduction in information 
asymmetry. 
 
As a second hypothesis, we focus on the analysts’ response to publication of an ARE, 
which can be a strategy to channel information through intermediaries such as financial 
analysts (Beaver, 1981) to increase firm visibility and attract investors. The literature on 
analyst following and the accuracy of analyst forecasts is huge (see, e.g., Baker, 2002; Ackert 
and Athanassakos, 2003; Coen et al., 2005; Malloy, 2005; Ali et al., 2007; Arya and 
Mittendorf, 2007; Aerts et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2008; Lehavy et al., 2009).6 Most of the 
studies indicate that analysts prefer to follow large firms listed on major exchanges with lower 
performance volatility (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Moreover, 
there is evidence that analyst following is impacted by institutional investor following (our 
third hypothesis) and voluntary disclosure, suggesting that there are opportunities to influence 
the likelihood of analyst following through these mechanisms (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
                                                 
6 For a review, see Ramnath et al. (2008). 
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Some of the most recent studies on analyst following even mention the possible effect of 
domestic analysts’ informational advantages compared to foreign analysts, due to language 
knowledge and cultural proximity. Bae et al. (2008a) assume that the decision to follow firms 
is made based on the costs and benefits of following foreign firms. On the cost side they 
expect that “costs presumably include primarily the direct costs of acquiring information 
about a new firm”. In their empirical tests they therefore include a dummy variable indicating 
the existence of a common language between analysts and the firm followed by these 
analysts. The results confirm their expectation: Foreign analyst following is greater when the 
firm’s country and the analyst’s country share a common language or colonial history. In Bae 
et al. (2008b), this finding is further refined not by looking at the existence of a “common 
language”, but by focusing on the “English language” specifically. They assume that foreign 
analysts are likely to be fluent in English, and therefore expect these analysts “to be at a 
disadvantage with regard to firms in countries where English is not the main language”. 
Ramnath et al. (2008) take a similar position and propose that future research might consider 
the effects of cultural differences across countries on analysts’ decision processes and 
forecasts. Our paper differs from past literature by focusing on the firm’s point of view rather 
than the analyst’s point of view. Our second hypothesis addresses all these issues and is 
expressed as follows: 
 
H2: Firms adopting English in their annual report increase their analyst following. 
 
Finally, we examine whether foreign ownership depends on the reporting language. There 
is a large body of literature examining the firm characteristics associated with institutional 
investor ownership (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Bushee, 2001; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 
2001; Ackert and Athanassakos, 2003; Doidge et al., 2009). These papers consistently find 
that institutions prefer larger firms that are listed on stock indexes and major exchanges. The 
possible interaction between language or cultural proximity and foreign ownership is less 
often mentioned in prior studies than liquidity and language proximity. In their study on 
trading behavior, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b) find that Finland-domiciled companies that 
publish their annual reports both in Finnish and Swedish are able to tap an abnormally large 
Swedish-speaking investor base, both in Finland and Sweden. They expect that “firms in other 
countries should be able to do the same to increase their investment appeal. For example, US 
companies, which generally publish their annual reports only in English, might be able to 
expand their investor base by publishing their annual reports also in, say Spanish and 
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Japanese”. Pagano et al. (2002) find that common language fosters “clustering” of institutions 
in countries that are geographically or culturally close to their country of incorporation. They 
believe this is mainly due to informational reasons. Kalev et al. (2008) compare the investor 
behavior of foreign and local investors on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. They expect and 
confirm “that information about single-listed stocks is more apparent to local investors who 
do not face language, distance or culture barriers”. Hence, foreign ownership is smaller for 
firms that do not communicate in English, since the informational disadvantage for foreign 
investors is larger than for companies publishing their accounts in English as well as their 
local language.  
The company’s international visibility is positively affected by adopting the English 
language, a language that nearly everybody is able to understand. Our third hypothesis 
therefore is: 
 
H3: Firms adopting English in their annual report enlarge their investor base. 
3. Methodology, variable description and sample 
3.1 Research design: the difference-in-differences (DD) methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we use a difference-in-differences (DD) setting, an empirical 
estimation technique commonly used in economics and, to a lesser extent, in the accounting 
and financial literature (see Daske et al., 2008). Let us take a hypothetical example where a 
firm decides to adopt English for external reporting purposes and publishes an ARE for 2005 
(in the early months of 2006). Let us also assume that in the year the change becomes 
effective and known to interested parties (year 2006, called year 1 in our statistical 
treatments), an outcome variable (e.g., analyst following) increased by 50% compared to the 
year before the change becomes effective (year 2005, called year 0 in our treatments). In order 
to estimate the impact of the change on analyst following, we could simply do a “before and 
after” analysis and conclude that the adoption of an ARE is associated with a 50% increase in 
analyst following. The problem is that there could be an unrelated trend towards more analyst 
following over time, and it is impossible to know whether the firm’s decision to publish an 
ARE or the time trend caused this increase in analyst following. 
One way to identify the impact of the “adoption” is to run a DD regression. If there is 
another firm that did not change its external reporting language, we could use it as a control to 
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compare the changes between English adopters and non-adopters between the two years. 
More precisely, we will run the regression: 
εβ
ββββ
++
×+++=
 variablesControl
eConsequenc Economic 3210
s
TimeTreatmentTimeTreatment
            [Eq. 1] 
Where  
- Economic Consequence is the economic consequence analyzed (analyst following for 
instance – we also use information asymmetry and foreign investor base);  
- Treatment is a dummy coded 1 if the firm adopted English at some point in time, 0 
otherwise; 
- Time is a time dummy coded 1 from the year the change becomes effective (i.e., one year 
after the period concerned by the annual report, 2006 for the 2005 annual report, in our 
example) and 0 until the year the change becomes effective; 
- Treatment × Time is the interaction of the Treatment dummy and the Time dummy; 
- Control variables vary across the dependent variables. These variables are included to 
control factors that are associated with the economic consequence analyzed, other than 
time and language. These variables are presented in section 3.3. 
 
This setting allows us to test the economic consequences of using English. Under this 
approach, we compute our proxies before and after the adoption of English for our treatment 
firms and for a control group (determined with a propensity score matching procedure – see 
below). If the adoption of English has economic consequences, we expect to see differences 
in the economic consequences between the treatment and control groups after the adoption. 
The use of a control group and the computation of time differences (before and after the 
change) provide natural controls for any confounding factors.  
The following table indicates the predicted value of an economic consequence for each of 
the possible scenarios.  
 
Predicted Economic Consequence Time = 0 Time = 1 
Treatment = 0 
0β  20 ββ +  
Treatment = 1 
10 ββ +  3210 ββββ +++  
 
0β  is the baseline average for non-adopters before the adoption, 1β  represents the 
differences between the two groups in year 0 (before the adoption), 2β  represents the time 
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trend in the control group (non-adopters), and 3β  represents the difference in the changes 
over time. Assuming that both firms have the same analyst following trend over time, we have 
now controlled for a possible time trend effect. We can then identify the true impact of 
adoption of English on analyst following ( 3β ). 
The usual “good” DD approach relies on a natural experiment, i.e., some change was 
expected to affect treatment for one group more than another, and the two groups should not 
otherwise differ. For this to work well, the natural experiment should be exogenous (i.e., the 
change must not be a reaction to behavior) and unlikely to induce people to “play the system” 
and change their behavior in unpredictable ways. In other words, the choice of a matching 
sample is a critical step in our methodology (see below). 
Under this DD procedure, a significant 3β  can be interpreted in at least three different 
ways. A first interpretation is that issuing an ARE is indeed associated with economic 
consequences. A second possible explanation is that an ARE contains more information than 
a local language annual report. Under this interpretation, a significant 3β  would not mean that 
using English has economic consequences, but that increased disclosure (in the English 
version of the annual report) has economic consequences. However, past research suggests 
that firms do not “take advantage” of the English version to report additional information and 
increase transparency. Campbell et al. (2005), for instance, carry out a content analysis of 
voluntary disclosure in an international comparison context. They examine the validity of 
volumetric comparison by recording word and sentence counts, using both original German 
documents and their English translations published by German companies themselves. They 
find that the English rendering of German environmental narrative is generally faithful to the 
German, suggesting that companies do not deliberately discriminate by reporting jurisdiction. 
In other words, we can study the use of English per se because there is no difference in 
content between the local-language annual report and the ARE.  
A third possibility is that the significance of 3β  is due to self-selection. Factors associated 
with the issuance of an ARE could be also associated with our outcome variables, creating a 
self-selection issue. We will see below in Table 1, Panel B, that English adopters are smaller 
and have more growth opportunities. Since these factors are potentially correlated with the 
economic consequences analyzed, we implement a propensity score matching (PSM) 
procedure initially proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  
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3.2 Research design: the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure 
This methodology is becoming increasingly popular in the accounting and finance 
literature (see Armstrong et al., 2009; Choi and Jiang, 2009; Clatworthy et al., 2009) and 
involves two stages. 
In the first stage, we estimate the probability of publishing an additional ARE with a 
Logit model. We are thus able to identify control firms that (1) have the same predicted 
propensity to use English as our treatment firms (adopters), and (2) continue to use the local 
language only for external reporting. In the second stage, we estimate equation 1 for treatment 
firms (adopters) and control firms (firms that continue to use only the local language but show 
the same propensity as our sample firms to issue an ARE). Propensity score matching 
essentially estimates each firm’s propensity to make a binary choice as a function of 
observables and matches firms with similar propensities. As Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
showed, if the propensities were known for each firm year, they would incorporate all the 
information about possible self-selection issues and propensity score matching could achieve 
optimal efficiency and consistency. In practice, the propensity must be estimated and 
selection is not only on observables, so the estimator may be both biased and inefficient. 
At the general level, we hypothesize the decision to issue an ARE to be driven by external 
financing needs. In other words, the issuance of an ARE should be related to the desire to 
attract new investors. More precisely, we expect the following variables to influence the 
likelihood to use an ARE: firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, leverage, level of 
international sales, the ownership structure and the issuance of debt or equity. We develop 
hereafter the rationales of including those variables in our propensity score procedure. 
Bonaccorsi (1992) develops a theoretical analysis of the obstacles preventing small firms’ 
internationalization: limited resources, lack of scale economies and high risk perception 
regarding international operations. Consistent with this framework, we expect the benefits of 
an ARE to increase with Firm size.  
All other things being equal, a highly profitable firm generates a large free cash flow. 
This lowers the need for external financing (Higgins, 1977). If the annual report is used to 
increase the visibility of the firm, then the need for an ARE should decrease with ROA. The 
publication of an ARE should show a negative association with Return on assets. 
Prior research has divided firm value into two components (Myers, 1977): the assets-in-
place, which are valued independently of the firm’s future investment opportunities, and the 
growth options, which are valued on the basis of the firm’s future investment decisions. As it 
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depends on future discretionary expenditures by managers, the value of growth options is 
subject to far more uncertainty than the value of assets-in-place. Myers (1977) notes that firms 
with abundant growth opportunities are more likely to be in need of external financing to fund 
current and future profitable projects. Reporting in English as well as the local language may 
facilitate fund-raising by enlarging the base of potential investors. This is why the publication 
of an ARE should be positively related to Growth opportunities. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that firms may refuse to issue stock, sometimes choosing 
to pass up valuable investment opportunities. Their findings are based on the assumptions that 
(1) managers know more about the firm’s value than potential investors and (2) managers act 
in the interest of existing shareholders, but also that (3) investors interpret the firm’s actions 
rationally. This model implies that highly-leveraged firms will not seek external equity 
financing. We expect the use of English as a second reporting language to be linked to the 
desire to raise equity. Thus, the publication of an ARE is expected to be negatively related to 
Leverage. 
According to Choi (1991), business internationalization leads the firm into a faster-
changing and more competitive context. Raffournier (1995) states that companies are induced 
to comply with the usual practices of countries in which they operate. “The more international 
the operations of a firm, the larger is the inducement” (1995, p. 266). Many previous studies 
in international business use international sales as an indicator for the degree of 
internationalization of a firm (Sullivan, 1994). Companies with international sales should 
need more than others an ARE. Thus, the publication of an ARE is expected to be positively 
related to the degree of Sales internationalization. 
Past research (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001) showed that institutional shareholders 
invest less in closely held firms. If the adoption of an ARE is related to the desire to attract 
new shareholders, then we should observe the issuance of an ARE to be negatively associated 
with the proportion of Closely held shares. 
Finally, we expect the likelihood to issue an annual report in English to be positively 
associated with the issuance of debt or equity in the future. This is why we anticipate a 
positive and significant coefficient on Future debt increase and Future equity increase. 
 
In addition to these eight variables, we also include industry and year dummies to control 
for fixed factors correlated with industry or country. We estimate the following Logit for each 
country: 
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To estimate Equation 2, we use the global reporting universe described later in this 
section. Panel A of Table 1 reveals that the sample size is 10,278 firm-year observations, 
48.8% classified as publishing an ARE and 51.2% as publishing only in local language. 
3.3 Variable description 
Variable descriptions are presented in Appendix 1. 
3.3.1 Dependent variables 
In studying the economic consequences of English adoption, we use proxies for 
information asymmetry, analyst following and ownership structure. 
Our first dependent variable is the bid-ask spread, which is a commonly used proxy for 
information asymmetry (e.g., Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Daske et al., 2008). Our next proxy is related to analyst following. Since analysts serve as 
information intermediaries, their presence should tend to increase transparency. Our third 
measure of economic consequences is related to the internationality of ownership. Data on 
ownership are provided by Thomson Ownership. This database indicates the country of 
residence (the “country” column) as well as the number of shares owned by each shareholder. 
We compute three measures of the internationality of ownership. For each measure, we count 
the number of “Foreign owners” (FO) for each firm-year observation.7 FO are defined as (1) 
owners from a country whose language is different from the one used in the firm’s country of 
incorporation; (2) all owners from a country different from the firm’s country of 
incorporation; (3) owners from an English-speaking country. Consider for instance a German 
firm, with four shareholders: one German, one Austrian, one Italian, and one English. Our 
three metrics set FO respectively at 2 (as Austria’s language is German), 3, and 1. For the 
sake of simplicity, we report only the first measure. 
                                                 
7 We did not use the alternative method of computing the total shareholdings of non-local owners, because we 
found inconsistencies in the continuity of this data as provided by Thomson Ownership. 
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3.3.2 Control variables 
For each dependent variable, we add control variables in equation 1. In all regression 
models, we include industry-, country-, and year-fixed effects. Thus, our specifications 
control for differences in countries’ adoption rates as well as time trends.  
In the spread regression, we control for firm size, return variability, share turnover 
(Chordia et al., 2000) and international standards (Daske et al., 2008). In the analyst following 
regression, we control for Size, Return on assets and Growth opportunities. Variable 
descriptions are presented in appendix. We expect bigger firms to be more followed by 
analysts, as well as firms with higher profitability and growth opportunities. In the foreign 
ownership regression, we control for International standards, Size, Financial leverage, 
Return on assets, and Growth opportunities (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001).  
3.4 Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we create a sample of firms that have adopted dual financial 
reporting (local language plus English language). The primary data source is the “Global 
reports database” (GR database) which contains all annual reports, whatever their language. 
From this database, we selected all firms from non-English speaking countries which issued 
an annual report (in any language) from 2004 to 2007.  
Insert table 1 about here 
As shown in Table 1, Panel A, from this initial database of 3,236 firms (10,278 firm-year 
observations on the 2004-2007 period), we analyzed the external language(s) used for each 
firm-year observation (Local language/English/Both). Even if the choice of language is 
independent of the decision to adopt different accounting policies8, we believe that companies 
listed in the US or the UK will be tempted to publish an ARE, as it might facilitate 
understanding of their financial statements by US or UK investors. Consequently, we have 
excluded cross-listed firms from our sample.9 Out of the 10,278 observations, 48.8% use 
English in their annual report, whereas 51.2% use only their local language in their annual 
report.  
                                                 
8 For example, foreign companies listed in the US must prepare a 20-F form, which is obviously written in 
English. However, the annual report of these companies (which is a separate document from the 20-F form) may 
still be published in their local language. 
9 To test the robustness of our results with regard to this hypothesis, we run the basic model including companies 
listed in the US or UK. Findings are robust to the inclusion of cross-listed firms from our sample. 
 19
We were able to identify 166 firms which adopted dual reporting according to the Global 
Reports database between 2004 and 2007. We hand collected and checked languages used in 
annual reports before and after the change date as identified from the Global Reports 
database. Annual reports were collected through the www.infinancials.com website, or if 
unavailable, through the firms’ websites.  
In Table 1, Panel B, we provide descriptive statistics on financial data for the universe 
(10,278 firm-year observations), for the treatment sample (556 firm-year observations) and 
for the control sample (1,269 firm-year observations). On average, mean (median) firm size , 
measured as the log of sales, for treatment firms is 4.324 (4.556) and appears to be smaller 
than for the entire universe: 4.506 (4.693). This difference is significant in mean as in median. 
Mean return on assets (ROA) is 2.4% (median: 3.7%) for the treatment group. These figures 
are statistically indistinguishable from the mean ROA (1.7%) and median ROA (3.6%) for all 
listed firms. The value of the firm represents on average (median) 1.961 (1.465) times the 
value of the capital employed (equity plus long-term debt), compared to 1.672 (1.306) times 
for all listed firms. Firms that adopted an ARE appear to have more growth opportunities than 
non-adopters (p-value of the t-test = 0.000, p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test = 0.000). No 
difference can be found in terms of leverage: its mean (median) value is 52.6% (55.0%) for 
the ARE adopters, which is comparable with the 51.2% (53.6%) for all listed firms. 
Surprisingly, firms from our treatment group exhibit a lower proportion of foreign sales 
(mean of 17.6%) than the entire universe (21.6%). However, intra industry variation in the 
proportion of ARE may explain this finding. Firms with an ARE do not differ from the entire 
universe in terms of ownership structure: on average the closely held shares represent 36.3% 
of the total number of shares versus 36.2% for the whole universe. Firms that adopt an ARE 
seem to lever funds either through equity or a debt offerings more frequently than other firms. 
On average, 57% (79%) of firms with an ARE issued equity (debt) during the period versus 
44.2% (73.9%) for other firms. Both proportions statistically and economically differ across 
sub samples. To summarize, firms with an ARE are smaller, have more growth opportunities, 
less international sales and more funding needs than the average listed firm in their respective 
countries. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our treatment sample. Panel A reports the 
country of origin and Panel B the industry classification of our sample. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Panel A reveals that sampled firms come from 16 different countries. Six countries 
(Germany, Sweden, Italy, Norway, Denmark and France) represent more than two thirds of 
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the observations. Those six countries have relatively well-developed capital markets, which is 
of help in the computation of information asymmetry measures; yet across and within these 
markets firms are likely to differ substantially in terms of transparency and liquidity. Firms 
also differ in terms of dominant local language, with 13 different languages used in the 
sampled countries.  
Panel B of Table 2 reveals that three sectors (Manufacturing, Finance and Service) 
account for more than 75% of the observations. This proportion differs from the distribution 
of all listed firms, which suggests that industry may be an important determinant of the 
decision to use English in the annual report. 
4. Empirical findings 
To test our hypotheses, we use a Difference-in-Differences (DD) setting. The treatment 
group consists of all English adopters. To be included in the “control group”, a firm must 
have a similar predicted probability to adopt English as the treatment firms. 
4.1 First stage of the propensity score matching 
We first report the results of the first stage of the propensity score matching. Equation 2 
was estimated country by country to determine the likelihood of publishing an ARE for each 
firm-year observation. As we cannot report the regression results for each country, Table 3 
reports the estimated coefficients for the whole sample, to demonstrate the economic intuition 
of our model.  
Insert table 3 about here 
Overall, the model is significant (Chi2 = 2052.846, p=0.000) and correctly classifies 
74.5% of the observations. This percentage is significantly higher than in a naïve model (no 
firms issue an ARE) that would have correctly classified 51.2% of observations (see Table 1, 
Panel A). All coefficients are significant. The coefficient on Size is positive (coeff = 0.594, 
z=26.331), suggesting that large firms tend to issue an ARE more frequently. This finding is 
consistent with intuition. As expected, the coefficient on Return is negative (coeff = - 0.695, 
z=-3.872), suggesting that profitable firms tend to issue an ARE less frequently. Firms with 
high growth opportunities tend to issue an ARE more frequently (0.179, z=7.670), whereas 
the opposite is true for the more highly-leveraged firms (coef = -1.428, z=-11.005). These 
findings are consistent with the idea that firms use English in order to increase their visibility 
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and thus raise funds. Consistent with our expectation, the more international the sales, the 
more likely the issuance of an ARE as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on 
Foreign sales (coef = 0.016, z=15.353). The ownership structure of the firm is associated with 
the likelihood of issuing an ARE: the coefficient on Closely held shares is negative (-0.005) 
and significant (z=-5.819) consistent with the idea that closely held firms are not prone to use 
English in their annual report. Finally, firms that will issue debt or equity in the future, tend to 
issue more frequently ARE as the coefficient on Future equity increase and Future debt 
increase are positive (0.352 and 0.203 resp.), and significant (resp. z=6.855, z=3.523). 
Overall, our findings suggest that firms issue an ARE when they need to raise money, or 
when exposed to demands from external parties (such as investors or customers). 
4.2 Difference-in-Differences regressions 
The treatment group consists of all English adopters. For each treatment group firm, we 
choose three control group firms that must meet three cumulative conditions. First, control 
firms need to be located in the same country. Second, we require control firms to have a 
similar propensity to use English to the treatment firm the year preceding the adoption of 
English. Finally, controls firms must not issue an ARE either before or after the change 
observed for our treatment firm.  
Table 4 reports our findings with this set of control firms. Table 4 consists of 3 panels: 
Panel A (findings for H1 Information asymmetry), Panel B (findings for H2 Analyst 
following) and Panel C (findings for H3 Foreign ownership). 
Insert table 4 about here 
In each panel, we present the results of the following regression [Eq. 1] 10: 
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The main coefficient of interest is the coefficient 3β  which translates the value of the 
effect of the adoption of English after controlling for time effects and factors that affect all 
comparable firms.  
Panel A tabulates findings for the bid-ask spread, our proxy for information asymmetry. 
Coefficient 1β  is positive (0.963) and significant (p=0.000), which implies that there is a 
                                                 
10 Observations are pooled three years before (after) the adoption of English, and we compute the mean 
economic consequence before (after) the adoption of English. 
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difference between the treatment and control sample before the adoption of English. More 
precisely, it implies that the treatment group suffered more from information asymmetry than 
the control group. Coefficient 2β  is negative (-0.011) and insignificant (p=0.902), which 
shows that there is no difference between the control sample before and after the adoption. 
The 3β  coefficient is negative and significant (-0.096, p=0.021). This means that, after 
controlling for time effects and factors that affect all firms, the adoption of English is 
associated with lower information asymmetry. In other words, by adopting English, firms can 
catch up around 10% of their bid-ask spread gap compared to the control group. Control 
variables are usually significant and consistent with prior literature. International standards is 
negative (-0.140) and marginally significant (p=0.142) consistent with (see Daske et al., 2008) 
who find a modest average effect of IFRS adoption on their proxies of information 
asymmetry. When comparing the magnitude of the coefficients on International standards 
and Treatment × Time, it appears that the effect of adopting language is far from being trivial 
as it represents the two thirds (0.096/0.140) of the effect of adopting higher quality accounting 
standards. Coefficients on Firm size and Share turnover are negative and significant. 
Consistent with intuition, large firms, and firms with frequently traded shares exhibit less 
information asymmetry. Finally, firms with volatile returns suffer from more information 
asymmetry.  
Findings for analyst following are presented in Panel B. Coefficient 1β  (0.224) is positive 
and significant (p=0.000), which means that the treatment group has more analyst following 
than the control sample before the adoption. Coefficient 2β  is insignificant (p=0.612), which 
shows that there is no difference between the control sample before and after the adoption. 
More importantly, the 3β  coefficient is positive and significant (0.108, p=0.063). This means 
that, after controlling for time effects and factors that affect all firms, the adoption of English 
translates into an increase of 10.8% of the number of analyst that follow the firm. Control 
variables are usually significant and consistent with prior literature: coefficients on Size, 
Return on assets and Growth opportunities are positive and significant. 
Panel C tabulates findings for foreign ownership. Coefficient 1β  (-0.002) is not 
significant (p=0.877), which shows that there is no difference between the treatment and 
control sample before the adoption. Coefficient 2β  is negative and insignificant (p=0.189), 
which shows that there is no difference between the control sample before and after the 
adoption. More importantly, the 3β  coefficient is positive and significant (0.067, p=0.003). 
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This means that, after controlling for time effects and factors that affect all firms, the adoption 
of English translates into a 6.7 point increase in the number of foreign owners. Control 
variables are usually significant and consistent with prior literature (see Dahlquist and 
Robertsson, 2001) with the notable exception of International standards that appears to be 
insignificant, whereas Covrig et al. (2007) showed that the voluntary adoption of IAS/IFRS is 
associated with a lower home investment bias. Note however, that our sample include 
mandatory IAS/IFRS adopters and past literature showed that benefits to the transition to 
IFRS can be confined to early adopters (see Christensen et al., 2008). 
Globally, all three panels are consistent with the hypotheses that the adoption of English 
is associated with lower information asymmetry, greater analyst following and higher foreign 
ownership. Our findings are also consistent with the idea that firms try to make up for a lack 
of visibility by using English for their external reporting purposes. 
6. Conclusions and implications 
In this paper, we argue that the language used in the annual reports is a crucial ingredient 
of the firm’s visibility. Past literature has stressed the importance of accounting 
harmonization, suggesting that if the “language of business” is unified then information 
asymmetry should decrease. This view has received considerable attention over the last 
twenty years from academics (Biddle and Saudagaran, 1989; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Covrig et al., 2007; Iatridis, 2008). Nonetheless, the association between accounting 
harmonization and positive economic consequences relies heavily on the assumption that 
market participants are able to read and understand any set of financial statements as long as 
they are governed by the same accounting rules. In practice, the first barrier (before we even 
reach the question of accounting standards) to understanding and comparing financial 
statements and increasing transparency is the language barrier. In this respect, using English 
for external reporting purposes is the only way to address any outsider of the firm easily and 
directly, irrespective of their nationality, and to reduce the costs of information acquisition by 
making the firm’s financial statements more accessible for investors and analysts. In this 
paper, we set out to analyze and assess the economic consequences of using English as an 
external reporting language for firms from non-English speaking countries. We test the 
relationship between publishing an annual report in English and several measures of 
information asymmetry, and analysts’ and investors’ behavior.  
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We use a sample of “adopter” firms that issued an ARE for the first time. This sample is 
drawn from the Global Reports database, which identifies the language used by firms in their 
annual reports. From this initial database of 3,236 firms (10,278 observations), we identify 
166 firms which published an ARE in addition to their local language report.  
Our findings are consistent with the idea that issuing an ARE (in addition to the local 
language) reduces information asymmetry, and increases analyst following and foreign 
investor ownership, after controlling for endogeneity. This paper thus contributes to the 
literature on market participants’ responses to firms’ communication policy and disclosure 
patterns. While prior literature has identified the use of the English language as a possible 
explanation for various phenomena observed in capital markets (home bias, institutional 
ownership, trading behavior etc.), our paper is the first to directly address the question of the 
possible economic consequences of issuing an annual report in English.  
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APPENDIX 1 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable  Description Source 
Dependent 
variables 
   
Analyst 
following 
= Analyst following= ln(1+ # of analysts). IBES through WRDS 
Bid-ask spread = Yearly median value of the absolute value of the 
daily bid-ask spread scaled by the mid point 
between the bid and ask price. 
Datastream 
(DS.Bidprice, DS.Askprice) 
Foreign 
ownership 
= Number of “foreign” investors over the total 
number of investors, as identified in the database. 
We define a “foreign” investor as an investor from 
a country whose language is different from the one 
used in the firm’s country of incorporation. 
Thomson Ownership 
(Thomson Financial) 
Independent 
variables 
   
Closely held 
shares 
= (Number of Closely Held Shares / Common 
Shares Outstanding) × 100 
Worldscope 
(WS. CloselyHeldSharesPct) 
Firm size = Market value of equity measured as the stock price 
times the number of shares outstanding (in US$ 
millions). 
Worldscope  
(WS.marketcap) 
Foreign sales = International Sales / Net Sales or Revenues × 100 
Firms with missing data are assumed not to have 
international sales. 
Worldscope 
(WS.ForeignSalesPctSales) 
Future debt 
increase 
= Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has a debt 
increase superior to the median debt increase of 
the sample in the next two years, and 0 otherwise. 
Worldscope  
(WS.TotalLiabilities)  
Future equity 
increase 
= Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has a equity 
increase superior to the median equity increase of 
the sample in the next two years, and 0 otherwise. 
Worldscope  
(WS.CommonStock) 
Growth 
opportunities 
= (Market value + Total debts)/Assets (simplified 
version of the definition provided by Klein 
(2002)). Data winsorized at 0.01. 
Datastream:  
(DS.MarketValue),  
Global (Standard and Poor’s): 
(mnemonic: [MKVAL + DT]/AT), 
Infinancials:  
(Market capitalization: code 11937, 
Total debts: code 54022), 
Worldscope (Thomson Financial): 
(WS.TotalAssets, WS.TotalDebt). 
Industry = Dichotomous variables used to represent different 
industries at the two-digit SIC code level: 
Agriculture (01-09), Mining-construction (10-17), 
Manufacturing (20-39), Transportation (40-49), 
Trade (50-59), Finance-Insurance (60-67), 
Services (70-89), Public administration (91-99). 
Infinancials  
(SIC sector code: code 20004),  
Worldscope  
(WS.PrimarySICCode). 
Classification: www.siccode.com 
International 
standards 
= Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm adopts 
IAS/IFRS or US GAAP and zero otherwise 
Worldscope  
(WS.acctgstdfollowed) 
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Leverage = Total debt/total assets ratio at year-end. Data 
winsorized at 0.01. 
Global: 
(mnemonic: [DT/AT]),  
Infinancials: 
(codes: 54022/53077),  
Worldscope: 
(WS.TotalAssets, WS.TotalDebt). 
Return = Income before extraordinary items/Total assets. 
Data winsorized at 0.01. 
Global: 
(mnemonic: ROA), 
Infinancials: 
(code: 5020), 
Worldscope: 
(WS.ReturnOnAssets),. 
Return 
variability 
= Return variability is computed as annual standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns. We compute 
return variability beginning in month -2 through 
month +10 relative fiscal year end. We use the log 
transformation of this measure to mitigate the use 
of outliers. 
Datastream  
(DS.index) 
Sales = Natural logarithm of the sales for the year. Global: 
(mnemonic: SALE),  
Infinancials: 
(code: 53002), 
Worldscope: 
(WS.Sales). 
Share turnover = Accumulated US$ trading volume during the year 
divided by market value of outstanding equity. We 
compute return variability beginning in month -2 
through month +10 relative fiscal year end. We 
use the log transformation of this measure to 
mitigate the use of outliers. 
Datastream  
(DS.volume) 
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Table 1 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
See Appendix 1 for a description of variables. 
 
In Panel A, the addition of firms (A) and firms (B) is higher than the total number of firms (3,236) because some 
firms decided to publish an ARE for the first time during the period.  
Observations to compute propensity scores (PS) in section 4 are taken from sub-samples A and B. For each 
“Treatment group” firm in section 4, we choose three “Control group” firms that must: (1) be located in the same 
country, (2) have a similar propensity to use English to the treatment firm the year preceding the change to 
English, (3) not issue an ARE either before or after the change of our treatment firm. 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 Number of 
Firm-Year 
Observations 
% Number of 
Firms 
Total number of annual reports stated in Global 
Reports (Infinancials) with available financial data 
(excluding cross-listed firms) 
Split between: 
10,278  3,236 
- Number of companies that issue an annual report 
in English (at least once over the period) (A) 
5,015 48.8 1,811 
- Number of companies that do not issue an annual 
report in English (B) 
5,263 51.2 2,069 
Number of adopters* with available data   166 
*“Adopter”: company deciding for the first time to publish an English version of its annual report, in addition to 
the local language version.  
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics of financial data 
 
See Appendix 1 for a description of variables. 
 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median p-value (t-test) p-value (MW U-test)  p-value (t-test) 
p-value (MW U-
test) 
 (Universe) (Treatment) (Control) (Treatment vs Universe) (Treatment vs Control) 
Sales 10,278 4.506 4.693 556 4.324 4.556 1,269 4.414 4.503 0.046 0.010 0.353 0.626 
Return 10,278 0.017 0.036 556 0.024 0.037 1,269 0.017 0.032 0.275 0.182 0.367 0.054 
Growth opportunities 10,278 1.672 1.306 556 1.961 1.465 1,269 1.555 1.215 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 10,278 0.512 0.536 556 0.526 0.550 1,269 0.510 0.524 0.169 0.167 0.194 0.129 
Foreign sales 10,278 0.216 0.000 556 0.176 0.000 1,269 0.185 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.515 0.867 
Closely held shares 10,278 0.362 0.361 556 0.363 0.365 1,269 0.345 0.302 0.968 0.923 0.285 0.129 
Future equity increase 10,278 0.442 0.000 556 0.570 1.000 1,269 0.451 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Future debt increase 10,278 0.739 1.000 556 0.790 1.000 1,269 0.749 1.000 0.005 0.005 0.059 0.059 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Treatment Sample 
See Appendix 1 for a description of variables. 
 
Panel A: Split of Adopters by Country and Languages Spoken 
Country name N %  Main language 
spoken 
Austria 4 2.4  German 
Belgium* 2 1.2  Dutch 
Denmark 14 8.4  Danish 
Finland 3 1.8  Finnish 
France 14 8.4  French 
Germany 39 23.5  German 
Greece 13 7.8  Greek 
Italy 16 9.6  Italian 
Netherlands 5 3.0  Dutch 
Norway 15 9.0  Norwegian 
Poland 5 3.0  Polish 
Portugal 5 3.0  Portuguese 
Spain 3 1.8  Spanish 
Sweden 21 12.7  Swedish 
Switzerland* 4 2.4  German 
Turkey 3 1.8  Turkish 
Total 166 100.0   
*Multi-lingual countries: For Belgium, we chose the language spoken by the majority of the population: Dutch 
(Flemish) (see http://www.nationmaster.com/country/be-belgium/lan-language), and for Switzerland, we chose 
German (see http://www.swissworld.org/en/people/language/language_distribution). 
 
Panel B: Split of Adopters by Industry 
Industry N % 
Mining-construction 7 4.2
Manufacturing 49 29.5
Transportation 14 8.4
Trade 17 10.2
Finance-Insurance 36 21.7
Services 42 25.3
Public administration 1 0.6
Total 166 100.0
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Table 3 
Results of the Logit Regression in Preparation of the Propensity Score Matching 
See Appendix 1 for a description of variables. 
 
A logit regression is run for each country. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the firm issues an annual report 
in English, 0 otherwise. As we cannot display the tables for all the countries, this table presents the results for a 
logit regression ran on all the firms with available data (N = 10,278). 
 
 
 Predicted 
signs 
Coefficients z p 
Size + 0.594 26.331 0.000 
Return - -0.695 -3.872 0.000 
Growth opportunities + 0.179 7.670 0.000 
Leverage - -1.428 -11.005 0.000 
Foreign sales + 0.016 15.353 0.000 
Closely held shares - -0.005 -5.819 0.000 
Future equity increase + 0.352 6.855 0.000 
Future debt increase + 0.203 3.523 0.000 
Industry effects   Included   
Year effects   Included   
Country effects   Included   
Constant  -1.710 -3.300 0.001 
Number of observations  10,278   
Chi square  2052.846   
p(chi2)  0.000   
Pseudo R-square  0.253   
Nagelkerke R-square  0.394   
Pct classified in sample  74.518   
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Table 4 
Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Economic Consequences around the Change to English 
(with a Propensity Score Matching) 
The difference-in-differences analysis is based on all companies issuing an English version of their annual report 
and randomly selected control companies with data available over the period. Control firms are comparable with 
treatment firms on the basis of a propensity score matching (same country, same year). The table reports 
regression results for the dependent variables, independent variables and control variables. We use three 
dependent variables in the analyses. Each panel displays the results of the three analyses we run: (A) Bid-ask 
spread is the yearly median value of the absolute value of the daily bid ask spread scaled by the mid point 
between the bid and ask price. (B) Analyst following equals ln(1+ # of analysts). (C) Foreign ownership is the 
number of “foreign” investors over the total number of investors, as identified in the Thomson Ownership 
database. We define a “foreign” investor as an investor located in a different country where the language is 
different from the one used in the country of the company in which she invests. We assess the statistical 
significance of the difference-in-differences values by using the 3β  coefficient for the following regression: 
εβ
ββββ
++
×+++=
 variablesControl
eConsequenc Economic 3210
s
TimeTreatmentTimeTreatment
  
where Treatment is a dummy variable coded one if the firm is a treatment firm (company which issued an ARE 
for the first time) and zero otherwise, Time is a dummy variable coded one if the year is at least one year after 
the change (first publication of an ARE), and zero otherwise, and Treatment*Time is an interaction variable. 
Note that all standard errors are clustered (White, 1980). See Appendix 1 for a description of variables. 
 
  Panel A: Bid-ask spread Panel B: Analyst following Panel C: Foreign ownership
  coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value 
Treatment   0.963 0.000 0.224 0.000 -0.002 0.877
Time -0.011 0.902 0.021 0.612 -0.022 0.189
Treatment × Time -0.096 0.021 0.108 0.063 0.067 0.003
       
Size -0.449 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.027 0.000
International standards -0.140 0.142    0.002 0.884
Return variability 0.075 0.002       
Share turnover -0.201 0.025       
Lag return on assets    0.001 0.108    
Growth opportunities    0.086 0.000    
Leverage       0.084 0.003
Return       -0.001 0.020
Growth opportunities       0.022 0.000
Country effects Included  Included  Included   
Industry effects Included  Included  Included   
Year effects Included  Included  Included   
Number of observations 2,950   3,346   2,555   
F 122.11   34.960   66.544   
Prob>F 0.000   0.000   0.000   
R-square 0.693   0.287   0.180   
Adjusted R-square 0.612   0.279   0.167   
 
